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VOLUME I:	 Technical Consultation Report
1.0 Authorization and Notification
The Mars Exploration Directorate requested an independent review of the Mars Reconnaissance
Orbiter MRO Battery Control Module (BCM) Recovery Plan on June 3, 2005.
Mr. Ralph Roe, Director of the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC), authorized a
Consultation Report be prepared in an out-of-board action by the NESC Review Board (NRB) on
June 24, 2005.
An independent review briefing of the MRO was created and presented on August 2, 2005 for
the Safety & Mission Readiness Review (SMARR), Mission Reconfiguration Review (MRR),
and the Material Review Board (MRB).
The consultation report was developed by Dr. James Sutter, NASA Glenn Research Center
(GRC), and Brian Muirhead, NESC Chief Engineer (NCE).
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2.0 Signature Page
Dr. James Sutter, Lead	 Date	 Dr. Debra Peeler	 Date
Brian Muirhead
	
Date	 Dr. Robert S. Piascik
	
Date
Dr. Henning Leidecker	 Date	 Dr. Binayak Panda	 Date
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3.0 List of Team Members, Ex Officio Members, and Others
NESC Review Team Members:
Dr. James Sutter, Lead, NASA GRC
Brian Muirhead, NESC Chief Engineer (NCE)
Dr. Debra Peeler, Wright Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB)
Dr. Henning Leidecker, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC)
Dr. Binayak Panda, NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC)
Dr. Robert Piaseik, NESC Discipline Engineer for Materials
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4.0 Executive Summary
The NESC was requested by the NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) to conduct an
independent review of the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter (MRO) Thermal/Vacuum (T/V)
Anomaly Assessment. Because the anomaly resulted in the surface contamination of the MRO,
selected members of the Materials Super Problem Resolution Team (SPRT) and the NASA
technical community having technical expertise relative to contamination issues were chosen for
the independent review (refer to Section 3.0 for team listing).
The consultation consisted of a review of the MRO Project's reported response to the assessment
findings (provided in Appendix F), a detailed review of JPL technical assessment final report
(provided in Appendix E), and detailed discussions with the JPL assessment team relative to
their findings.
It is the judgment of the NESC Review Team that the independent JPL MRO Thermal/Vacuum
Anomaly Independent Assessment Team (T/V AIAT) has addressed questions/concerns to the
team's satisfaction. Moreover, the T/V AIAT assessment was complete and the conclusions of
the JPL assessment identified the appropriate technical considerations so that the MRO Project
can identify the approach (resolution) with minimal/acceptable risk.
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5.0 Consultation Plan
The assessment of the MRO contamination issue required a review team with expertise in
polymer-based materials, electronic materials, materials analytical methods, and basic
knowledge in vacuum deposition and cleaning methods.
The NESC Review Team conducted an in-depth review of the following two documents,
provided by JPL:
T/V AIAT report entitled, MR  T/V Anomaly Independent Assessment Report — Rev H,
by Charles Whetsel, et al., April 20, 2005. Refer to Appendix E.
2.	 Response by the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter (JWR0) Project to the Actions
Recommended by the MR  T/VAnoinaly Independent Assessment Team (DRAFT), by
Richard Zurek (MRO Project Scientist), June 13, 2005. Refer to Appendix F.
Based on the detailed review of the above documents, the NESC Review Team formulated
review questions (refer to Appendices B and C). The review questions were then used as a basis
for detailed technical discussions with the JPL MRO T/V AIAT. This technical exchange
resolved the initial set of questions and triggered additional discussions.
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6.0 Description of the Problem, Proposed Solutions, and Risk Assessment
During thermal vacuum testing of the MRO spacecraft during February 2005 1 , the spacecraft
was contaminated by material outgassed from a ground-support heater panel inside the chamber
during the test.
Subsequent to the contamination event, the MRO project has taken steps to:
1) Identify the contaminant and its source.
2) Assess the extent of the contaminant and its impact to the contaminated surfaces.
3) Remove the contaminant from all feasible surfaces while assessing the impact to the
mission from the surfaces which are impractical to clean.
During the period of April 11 through 20, 2005, an independent JPL Assessment Team from
outside of the MRO Project convened to "identify, evaluate, and assess the risk to the MRO
spacecraft, particularly the science payload" while making "use of existing data and information
as much as practical". The JPL Assessment Team was additionally asked to "identify and
discuss root cause of the anomaly, and corrective actions, in addition to the corrective actions
taken for the affected hardware". Given the strong desire to complete this activity prior to the
planned shipment of the spacecraft to the launch site, the team chose to prioritize activities
related to the assessment of corrective actions for the affected hardware rather than the corrective
actions implied for "process improvement' for the benefit of future missions. Refer to Appendix
E.
'Performed at Lockheed Martin Astronautics (LMA) in Littleton, Colorado
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7.0 Data Analysis
The independent review concentrated on the following issues:
Proper identification of the contaminant (analysis techniques).
2. Potential deleterious effects of the contaminant.
3. Removal of the contaminant.
Based on this review, the NESC Review Team compiled an initial set of technical questions,
concerns, and suggestions relevant to the contamination issue and proposed corrective actions
(refer to Appendix B). The NESC Review Team concentrated on potential harmful effects of
polyurethane paint off-gases on other MRO components. Further information and suggested
experiments that may determine if off-gases could affect the Solar Calibration target were
required. This list was provided to Brian Muirhead (NESC Chief Engineer, JPL) and Dr. Robert
Piascik (NESC Materials SPRT Lead, LaRC). The information was then relayed to the T/V
AIAT.
On June 22, 2005, the NESC Review Team, the T/V AIAT Chairman (Charles Whetsel), and
other T/V AIAT members conducted a teleconference to discuss the NESC Review Team's
technical questions, concerns, and suggestions. At this initial meeting, the NESC Review Team
requested further details of decontamination experiments, instruments used to detect
contaminants and photographs that would provide an adequate description of MRO and its
subsystems. Refer to Appendix C for an additional list of requested information. The NESC
Materials SPRT Team completed the review of the additional MRO contamination/
decontamination data sent by Charles Whetsel on June 29, 2005.
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8.0 Findings, Root Causes, Observations, and Recommendations
	
8.1	 Findings
It is the judgment of the NESC Review Team that the independent JPL Assessment Team
satisfactorily addressed all questions and concerns. Moreover, the TN AIAT assessment was
complete and the conclusions of the JPL Assessment Team, with regard to minimal/acceptable
risk, are appropriate.
	
8.2	 Recommendations
The NESC Review Team offers the following recommendations, listed in order of importance,
relevant to the ongoing MRO work associated with the contamination issue.
R-1. Expose scrap SCT material to similar outgasses to reproduce the anomaly. Perform
simulated UV exposure to determine effect on contaminant. Evaluate surface to observe
changes in contaminant (freckling).
R-2. If MRO TN AIAT proceeds with solvent cleaning of SCT surface, the NESC
recommends evaluation of adhesive bonding SCT to its substructure to determine if the
cleaning solvent has degraded bond strength.
R-3. COZ aerosol cleaning trials should be conducted on scrap/exposed (contaminated) SCT
material. The CO Z aerosol cleaning method may avoid issues with solvent cleaning.
The MRO Project has satisfactorily responded to the above recommendations. Refer to
Appendix D for the MRO Project's response to the NESC Recommendations.
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9.0 Lessons Learned
No significant lessons-learned were generated during this review.
NESC Request No. 05-038-E
NASA Engineering and Safety Center Document#: Version:
Technical Consultation Report RP-05-122 1.0
Title: Page #:
NESC Independent Review of the 12 of 56
Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter (MRO) Contamination
Thermal/Vacuum (T/V) Anomaly Technical Consultation Report
10.0 Definition of Terms
Corrective Actions Changes to design processes, work instructions, workmanship practices,
training, inspections, tests, procedures, specifications, drawings, tools,
equipment, facilities, resources, or material that result in preventing,
minimizing, or limiting the potential for recurrence of a problem.
Finding	 A conclusion based on facts established during the assessment/inspection
by the investigating authority.
Lessons Learned	 Knowledge or understanding gained by experience. The experience may
be positive, as in a successfid test or mission, or negative, as in a mishap
or failure. A lesson must be significant in that it has real or assumed
impact on operations; valid in that it is factually and technically correct;
and applicable in that it identifies a specific design, process, or decision
that reduces or limits the potential for failures and mishaps, or reinforces a
positive result.
Observation	 A factor, event, or circumstance identified during the
assessment/inspection that did not contribute to the problem, but if left
uncorrected has the potential to cause a mishap, injury, or increase the
severity should a mishap occur.
Problem	 The subject of the independent technical assessment/inspection.
Recommendation	 An action identified by the assessment/inspection team to correct a root
cause or deficiency identified during the investigation. The
recommendations may be used by the responsible C/P/P/O in the
preparation of a corrective action plan.
Root Cause	 Along a chain of events leading to a mishap or close call, the first causal
action or failure to act that could have been controlled systemically either
by policy/practice/procedure or individual adherence to
policy/practice/procedure.
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11.0 Minority Report
There were no dissenting opinions. Team recommendations were unanimous.
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Appendix B. NESC Review Team Questions and TN AIAT Response
NESC Question # 1.
The Aeroglaze series of coatings from Lord are typically non exotic in their resins, with
additions to the resins creating the distinction between the Aeroglazes in the series. They are
moisture curing polyurethanes - and a composition of expected outgasses should be available.
The outgas composition would be very helpful in understanding potential re what contaminants
one would expect to find, and their solubility in the cleaners being used. Please provide this
information in the CD or other means of communication.
T/V AIAT Response: Results of chemical analysis subsequent to the contamination event is
included on the CD-ROM being sent.
NESC follow-up: After a brief review of the CD that Charles sent, it seems that there should
have been residual gas analysis done that would help put more details to the IR results that
qualify the contaminants as "polyamines, etc." Low Priority.
NESC Question #2.
COZ aerosol might be a player in cleaning the roughened collector surface, no mention of much
beyond the solvents. Were there any attempts to use these cleaning methods? Surface analysts
would have cleaned with COz- baked and reevaluated the surface.
T/V AIAT Response: Has not been tried yet. Should be passed on to the project for evaluation.
NESC follow-up: Please follow-up with Project. Low priority.
NESC Question #3.
Re the decision to leave the Solar Calibration Target untouched. Apparently there is still some
possibility that there are unwanted residues on this target, and an operational strategy has been
planned to check calibrations after launch, both before serious UV exposure happens and then
after some appreciable UV dose is acquired. I note that one could expose a small (a disk 2 mm
in diameter) to UV now, and check the extent of darkening. Waiting until after launch for
checking the potential for UV darkening is a way of ensuring that it is impossible to carry out
"hands on" work with this target. Please comment on the feasibility of performing a trial as
suggested above.
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T/V AIAT Response: Would require comment from the project as to whether an accelerated
aging test by exposure to UV is feasible.
NESC follow-up: To whom should we direct this request? This sets the stage for the
recommendation made in the power point package: perform UV exposure tests on SCT scrap
samples that were exposed to outgassing. If freckling of the SCT surface occurs ... then an in-
flight problem may be a larger concern. High Priority.
NESC Question #4.
What is the adhesive for the SCT?
NESC Question #5.
Could this adhesive have outgassed and contaminated the SCT?
T/V AIAT Response: These questions (#4 & #5) are beyond the scope of our investigation, but
might be addressed by the project.
NESC follow-up: Issue #4, above, also leads to the concern that if there was cleaning performed
on an intact SCT, that the solvent may induce some dissolution of the adhesive and contaminate
the SCT surface further.
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Appendix C. Additional Information Requested from TN AIAT
(As a result of the June 22, 2005 meeting)
Deb Peeler's Comments:
1. The Aeroglaze series of coatings from Lord are typically non exotic in their resins, with
additions to the resins creating the distinction between the Aeroglazes in the series. They
are moisture curing polyurethanes - and a composition of expected outgases should be
available. The outgas composition would be very helpful in understanding potential re
what contaminants one would expect to find, and their solubility in the cleaners being
used. Please provide this information in the CD or other means of communication.
2. Other well known techniques surface analysis techniques might be used in these ongoing
MCS contamination identification effort. ESCA, RAMAN, FTIR spectroscopy, etc-
might prove more useful based one would expect from products of this degraded coating.
3. COZ aerosol might be a player in cleaning the roughened collector surface, no mention of
much beyond the solvents. Were there any attempts to use these cleaning methods?
Surface analysts would have cleaned with COZ- baked and reevaluated the surface.
Binayak Panda's Comments:
1. For the on-going MCS Contamination Recovery Activities, a relatively new analytical
technique, UV-LINF, is being used. It was unclear to me as to the merits of this technique
over the conventional FTIR, Raman or XPS. Since this analysis is on-going, is it possible
for us to obtain the technical report of the findings of this technique? Please provide the
details in a CD or other form of communication.
Henning Leidecker's Comments:
1. "Re HiRise: The following were reported for Location A:..., Silicone, ..." I have
searched the document for "silicone" and find only this one reference to it. I would like a
discussion of what this particular sort of "silicone" is, and where it came from, and why
none was found anywhere else. I worry that it may be more widely present. And I note
that some forms of "silicone" are effectively opaque when thicker than a few tens of
monolayers. Was there any other testing not mentioned in the report that confirmed the
presence of Silicone anywhere else?
2. Re the decision to leave the Solar Calibration Target untouched. Apparently there is still
some possibility that there are unwanted residues on this target, and an operational
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strategy has been planned to check calibrations after launch, both before serious UV
exposure happens and then after some appreciable UV dose is acquired. I note that one
could expose a small (say a disk 2 mm in diameter) to UV now, and check the extent of
darkening. Waiting until after launch for checking the potential for UV darkening is a
way of ensuring that it is impossible to carry out "hands on" work with this target. Please
comment on the feasibility of performing a trial as suggested above.
Jim Sutter's Comments:
1. There are 9 or 10 Aeroglaze Z306s listed in the NASA Outgassing Database. Who has
the chemical composition of the Z306 used in this HiRise ground support heater and what
are the outgassing characteristics? What is the structure of the polyurethane?
2. Would any of the organic components present in the off-gasses act as a corroding agent
for other MRO components or interact with its Martian orbital environment to become
corrosive?
3. Are the chemical details of the PU components and their offgas byproducts revealed in
the detailed information on the CD or some other form of communication?
4. Isopropyl alcohol (IPA) wipes were used on the MLI (multilayer insulation). IPA
typically contains traces of water. Both IPA and H2O diffuse into Kapton ... was the
MLI (usually MLI is Ag coated PTFE or the like) in this case Kapton? What was done to
ensure that these cleaning methods did not leave behind possible contaminants that could
be released on orbit?
5. Since April, have the planned experiment to the MCS been performed? Results? Was a
second TV rebalancing necessary? JPL could get some idea of how contamination might
re-contaminate components when MRO is on orbit and undergoes heat-up (such as
aerobraking).
6. Were the ethyl acetate, acetone and IPA treated to remove water and other impurities
before washing MRO components? Residue from these solvents may never have been
removed and they could confound the results from the NVR.
7. What were the MLI blanket surface cleanliness levels before TN?
8. Has a TGA/FTIR (Thermogravimetric Analysis/Fourier Transform Infrared) been
performed on the polyurethane in the Lord Co. product to determine if the composition of
off-gasses. If not, then recommend doing the experiment in N 2 or Ar. Do not use air for
this TGA experiment?
9. Where is the frill reference from Bob Headsel @ Lord?
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10. What type of product is formed from Aeroglaze when it is beyond its shelf-life? Is there
any of this paint left? Was the paint stored according to manufacturer's suggested
conditions (get temperature range for storage .. it's usually on the can)?
11. What type of Aluminum is the MC S solar calibration unit roughened metal surface?
12. Was the older Aeroglaze used in these recontamination tests?
13. The KSC UV-LINF studies on the SCT show different results than anything done at
LMA. The areas tested were on the edge of the SCT. I believe that maybe an area where
the underlying adhesive is located. This begs the question: What temperatures did this
area of the SCT experience?
14. What is the adhesive for the SCT?
15. Could this adhesive have outgassed and contaminated the SCT?
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Appendix D. MRO Project Response to NESC Recommendations
Email: Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2005 12:15:01 -0700
From: Brian K Muirhead); To: Jim Sutter, Bob Piascik
Here is the MRO project's response to your suggested recommendations from your final report.
Do you have any problem with their response? It looks like they frilly considered and/or acted
on your recommendations (i.e. was responsive).
Thanks again for your thorough and timely support and assessment.
Brian
Here is my first reaction to the NESC report's recommendations (abbreviated here).
In short, the MCS team and MRO Project have concluded that cleaning the target is more likely
to invalidate, rather than restore, the ground calibration. Emphasis is now on trying to sequence
a view of the MCS solar target in early to mid-cruise. Any further testing with the MCS target
cut-off (scrap) piece would be devoted to seeing if the target would darken significantly with less
than 25 hours of direct exposure to sunlight in flight.
1. Expose scrap SCT material to reproduce contamination event... perform simulated UV
exposure...
This was tried with MCS sample target material and by heating the cold plate painted with the
same material and cured at the same time as the heater plate used in T/V. What we found was
that it was difficult to get the same contamination on the samples. The material deposited had a
less prominent polyurethane structure. Also, the sample pieces used were not "finished" in the
same way as the final flight target. In any case the flight target did not look anything like the
contaminated nor the cleaned sample pieces. The MCS Team has since located a cut-off piece
which was finished in the same way as the flight target surface. Analysis of material removed
from a piece of that cut-off scrap indicated that its surface had material present that was similar
to the flight target. We are debating whether to expose the uncleaned portion of the target cut-off
to solar radiation to see how quickly the material darkens.
2. Assess effect of solvent cleaning on target adhesive.
It was decided not to clean the target, because: 1) the acetone-brushing needed to remove
contaminate appeared to be altering the target surface; 2) there was no evidence of polyurethane
contaminate above the background introduced by the nylon brushing; and 3) as noted earlier,
examination of a cut-off piece indicated that whatever organics are on the target may have been
present during ground calibration of the target.
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3. Conduct trials with CO2 aerosol cleaning...
This was considered, but previous experience indicates that this approach--effective in removing
particulates--is not effective in removing deposited molecular films. Thus, this approach was not
pursued.
Other:
The NESC Review Team members raised the issue of whether the adhesive used to mount the
solar target plate to its substructure was itself a source of contamination. The target (in its
mounting structure) was baked out at higher temperatures than were encountered during system
thernal/vacuum testing and no out-gas flow was detected during calibration of the instrument in
its stand-alone TN testing.
Rich Zurek
MRO Project Scientist
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Appendix E. MRO TN Anomaly Independent Assessment Report Final,
Revision H, April 20, 2005
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1.	 Executive Summary
During thermal vacuum testing of the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter (MRO) spacecraft during the
month of February 2005, at Lockheed Martin Astronautics (LMA) in Littleton, Colorado, the
spacecraft was contaminated by material outgassed from a ground-support heater panel inside the
chamber during the test.
Subsequent to the contamination event, the MRO project has taken steps to 1) identify the
contaminant and its source, 2) Assess the extent of the contaminant and its impact to the
contaminated surfaces, and 3) Remove the contaminant from all feasible surfaces, while
assessing the impact to the mission from the surfaces which are impractical to clean.
During the period of April 101 through 20t ' a team of JPL employees from outside of the MRO
project was convened to "identify, evaluate, and assess the risk to the MRO spacecraft,
particularly the science payload" while making "use of existing data and information as much as
practical." The team was additionally asked to "identify and discuss root cause of the anomaly,
and corrective actions, in addition to the corrective actions taken for the affected hardNvare."
Given the strong desire, if feasible, to complete this activity prior to the planned shipment of the
spacecraft to the launch site, the independent assessment team chose to prioritize activities
related to the assessment of corrective actions for the affected hardware above corrective actions
implied for "process improvement' for the benefit of future missions.
In all areas except the expected performance of the contaminated Mars Climate Sounder (MCS)
calibration target, the independent assessment team was provided with data that allows us to state
that the residual risk remaining from this event is exceedingly unlikely to cause any degradation
of the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter mission. The MCS investigation team has stated that they
believe that risk associated with cleaning their solar calibration target is greater than the expected
degradation from the contamination. Additional testing is planned to determine if cleaning is
feasible without damaging the target.
The project did a commendable job supporting this investigation by readily providing all
requested material which was available in a timely manner. The investigation especially wishes
to thank Tim Gasparrini and Neil Tice of LMA, Rich Zurek, Dan McCleese, Brian Blakkolb,
Ray Garcia, and Gus Forsberg of JPL, Mike Malin and Mike Ravine of Malin Space Science
Systems (MSSS), and David Paige of UCLA.
NESC Request No. 05-038-E
NASA Engineering and Safety Center Document#: Version:
Technical Consultation Report RP-05-122 1.0
Title: Page #:
NESC Independent Review of the 29 of 56
Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter (MRO) Contamination
Thermal/Vacuum T/V Anomaly Technical Consultation Report
2. Description of Anomaly
Following completion of thermal vacuum (T/V) testing of the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter
during the month of February 2005, at Lockheed Martin in Littleton, Colorado, the spacecraft
contamination was first noted by discoloration of germanium-coated Kapton TM radome on the
UHF antenna upon completion of the test. Visual inspection, analysis of Non-Volatile Residue
(NVR) wipes, and analysis of witness samples and optics from the chamber using Fourier
Transform Infrared Spectrometry, and UV transmission confirmed the presence of a thin-film
organic contaminant over surfaces of the spacecraft. Thermoelectric Quartz-Crystal
Contamination Monitor (TQCM) and Residual Gas Analyzer (RGA) equipment was installed
and used to actively monitor for potential contamination during the T/V test. The RGA was not
sensitive enough to detect the presence of contamination at the levels which occurred. The
TQCM's were located to optimize their ability to detect contamination along the optical axis of
the sensitive payload elements, and as such, they did not register the contamination as it
occurred, since the contamination flux was weak along that axis. Maps of the concentration of
the contaminant were created by LMA after the test based on the material collected via NVR
wipes.
The source of the contamination was isolated both by proximity as well as chemical analysis of
the contamination, to be material outgassed from a ground-support heater panel inside the
chamber during the test. The heater panel is referred to as the "HiRISE Test Heater Plates" (so-
called because of their proximity to the HiRISE instrument when installed in their test
configuration). The heater panel was specially manufactured for the MRO T/V test and painted
with Aeroglaze Z306, manufactured by Lord Chemical Company. For an appropriate thermal
characterization of the spacecraft, this heater panel was required to operate at a steady-state
temperature of 140 °C for greater than 24 hours. This temperature has been confirmed to be in
excess of the manufacturer's recommended service temperature for the paint.
3. Assessment Methodology
Given the expedited timeframe over which this investigation has had to operate, the priorities of
the team were focused on assessments of the 1) efforts of the project to determine the extent of
the contamination, 2) effectiveness of cleaning and recovery activities undertaken by the project,
3) residual risk to the mission after completing these activities. Given that the proximate cause,
the heater panel which was the source of the contamination, was unarguably identified, a limited
amount of the team's time was invested in further pursuit of the root cause, although a brief
discussion of this is included
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As recommended by the charter, the team attempted to conduct the investigation making "use of
existing data and information as much as practical." A thorough briefing package has been
maintained by LMA covering the history of the anomaly and the subsequent investigation and
cleaning activities. The team also reviewed the Thermal Vacuum Test Procedure and the
presentation material from the Environmental Test Readiness Review. Results of NVR and
Fourier Transform Infrared (FTIR) analysis of the contaminant from the JPL Analytical
Chemistry Laboratory were also reviewed.
To supplement review of this written material the independent assessment team conducted
interviews at JPL with both the MRO project contamination control engineer, Brian Blakkolb,
the project scientist, Richard Zurek, Ray Garcia, a member of the MRO thermal team, and Gus
Forsberg, a materials properties expert from JPL's Propulsion and Materials Engineering
Section, as well as teleconferences with the MRO project mechanical systems manager, Tim
Gasparrini, and the lead thermal engineer, Neil Tice, from LMA.
Additionally, contemporaneous with the formation of this team, the project held a teleconference
at which each investigation team provided their assessment of the extent and impact of the
contamination and their plans going forward. The team also reviewed material provided by each
of the instrument teams. The team requested additional material not included in these packages,
as warranted. Email interactions with both the MARCI/CTX team (Mike Malin and Mike
Ravine of MSSS) as well as the MCS team (Dan McCleese of JPL) were initiated by the team.
Furthermore, as the investigation proceeded, additional data and results provided by the CRISM
were forwarded to the team by the MRO Project Scientist. A teleconference with David Paige at
UCLA, calibration lead on the MCS team was also conducted.
The team conducted the investigations using daily meetings (ranging from 1-4 hours each) and
interviews together as a group with offline review of materials by individuals, and email
correspondences within the team and between the team and members of the project between the
dates of 4/11 and 4/19.
4.	 Risk Analysis
This section addresses potential risks associated with the anomaly that the independent
assessment team identified and requested information from the project. For each risk area
identified, a brief description of the risk is included, followed by a list of the findings presented
to the team regarding this risk, our assessment of the situation, and recommendations (if any) for
additional work that the project should consider completing at a later time.
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4.1.	 Risk 1: Pavload contamination
4.1.1.	 Risk Description
Instrument contamination compromises science objectives of mission.
4.1.2.	 Findings
MARCL• Measurements on witness plates revealed that the residue strongly absorbs UV
radiation [c£ Reference 1]. The exterior optics of MARCI was exposed to the contaminant.
After the contamination event the exterior optics were cleaned several times. Measured UV
transmission at 260 nm after the first cleaning was about 10% higher than before the first
cleaning. Subsequent cleanings did not improve measured transmission. The inferred
contamination was significantly less than on nearby witness plates, but the witness plates were
oriented more directly toward the contamination source and MARCI optics were partially
shielded. These observations were reported by M. Malin, MARCI Principal Investigator, as part
of References 2 and 8.
CTX: The baffle and front were visually inspected after the contamination event. There was no
visible contamination on the optical surface. A spotty pattern was seen on the alignment flat but
thought not be related to the TV event in question. Tests were performed on optics Modulation
Transfer Function (MTF) and camera radiometric performance. These tests did not indicate any
degradation. These observations were also reported by M. Malin, CTX Principal Investigator, as
part of Reference 2.
HIRISE: After the contamination event, several surface samples were obtained. The two of
relevance to possible optics contamination were on the interior of the struction — one on the
Interior GrCE baffle, inside 1st baffle (inside past sunshade, Location A, from Reference 3), the
other on the Interior - black Kapton TM Multi-layer Insulation (MLI) blanket surface (inside
aperture, Location B, from Reference 3). The interior of the stricture was not in a line-of-site
path to the source. The exterior blanket was also sampled.
The following were reported for Location A:
NVR = 0.12 mg/ft 2 , Area sampled: 96 in 
FTIR spectra 05-0942 indicates Aliphatic Hydrocarbon, Aromatic Ester, Silicone, trace of
Urethane
Note only the cylindrical surface of the graphite composite baffle tube was sampled, between the
1 st and 2nd baffle rings, so a relatively large area was covered. No significant amount of
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urethane was detected. Other chemical constituents listed are commonly detected on BATC
hardware.
The following were reported for Location B:
NVR = 0.43 mg/ft2  Area sampled: 10 in 
FTIR spectra 05-0945: Aliphatic Hydrocarbon, Ester, possible trace of Urethane.
No significant Urethane residue was detected, especially when compared to the other molecular
contaminants. Since this blanket is on the secondary mirror structure, it is the best representation
of the contamination that may have entered the telescope aperture and deposited on the primary
mirror. Only 1/2 of the blanket area was sampled, so a second sample may be possible if deemed
necessary to corroborate the first sample.
Reference 3 also states that `No "direct line of sight" to contamination source and "cold wall"
chamber precluded contamination of optics'. A triple cleaning of the external sunshade MLI
surfaces by light wipe of IPA dampened Technicloth or Alphawipe cloths was recommended.
As of Monday, April 18 t1i the project has reported that this cleaning of HiRISE external surfaces
and blankets has been completed.
CRISM: The following was reported by the CRISM team in Reference 4 (underlines indicate
updates to current status as of time of the report):
Contamination was found on baffle, data processing unit (DPU), and radiator MLI
— All had direct line-of-sight to the heater plate
— LMA has sampled MLI and DPU KaptonTM with ethyl acetate (NVR analysis
done)
— LMA has cleaned white paint and radiator surface with IPA (no NVR)
— LMA has cleaned baffle and radiator MLI and DPU Kapton TM with IPA
• Internal CRISM optics have not been affected
— Analysis of data collected after event indicates no contaminant present
In Reference 5, Scott Murchie, CRISM PI, reported on work done by Dave Humm who carefully
documented before/after changes in radiometric properties of the instrument determined from a
calibration of a Spectralon target, placed at a 45° angle in front of the telescope, done on April 6,
2005. Changes in radiometric properties between these measurements and a prior calibration in
December, if any, were within measurement uncertainty (---2.5%). Details are given in Reference
5. In summing up the evaluation, Dave Humm writes, "I conclude the contamination event in
spacecraft thennal vacuum testing had no impact on VNIR perfonnance. "
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MCS: Reference 6 states: "As MCS was safed throughout this phase of the test, contamination
of the instrument optics and blackbody is expected to be negligible. However, the solar target
was continuously exposed and was cold (-40°C), and is strongly suspected to have suffered some
contamination.
The calibration target has a mechanically roughened aluminum surface whose purpose is to serve
as a photometrically stable and well-characterized calibration target for reflected sunlight from
UV to 3-microns wavelength in the infrared. The target is thermally isolated from the spacecraft
and the MCS instrument, and includes temperature sensors to monitor how much radiant energy
is absorbed by the target. Changes during flight of the solar-weighted average reflectivity can be
monitored and understood from the temperature measurements.
The MCS team has expressed some concern over the feasibility of cleaning the solar calibration
target, given the likelihood of damaging either the surface of the target or its adhesive mounting
using the techniques which have been successfully employed to clean other surfaces.
As of the date of this report, the principal investigator D. McCleese has decided to not clean the
calibration target unless the results of planned cleaning tests are favorable. If it is not cleaned (a
worst-case scenario) the team would need to deal with the consequences of a contaminated
target. The most severe impact to science in this case comes from the change in target
reflectivity that occurred during the TV contamination event. Changes during flight are
important as well, but temperature measurements of the target will provide a basis for knowledge
of temporal change. The amount of degradation is not known. To deal with it the team might be
able to make measurements of astronomical targets (the moon, Mars) which have been calibrated
by other experiments.
ONC: The ONC was mounted on the far side of the spacecraft from the source of the
contamination. In Reference 7, Steve Synnott, the ONC Principal Investigator, notes that the
"wavelength absorption problem caused by the contamination material is almost entirely outside
the bandwidth that ONC observes," and goes on with his assessment that the "combination of
very low probability of ONC contamination and the non-overlapping bandwidths has made my
concern about this problem negligible." ONC optics were visually inspected by Doug Beasley,
JPL quality and no contamination was visible on the ONC optics.
4.1.3.	 Assessment
General comment: Cleaning of the external non-optical surfaces was not documented for some
instruments. Re-volatilization of these surfaces during flight may pose a risk depending on the
temperature these surfaces achieve. For the payload, the most critical areas would be
decontamination heaters (if any) or structures which my warm during aerobraking, or any
electronics parts that may have accumulated contaminant.
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MARCI: Although the external optics were contaminated, they were cleaned and transmission
measurements subsequent to cleaning indicate that the optics are clean. Based on this, we do
not see a remaining risk.
CTX: Post-anomaly testing showed no degradation in MTF and radiometric response. We see
no remaining risk.
HIRISE: The optics were protected by a `cold window' during TV operation, so no contaminant
is expected to be on the optics, and samples near the optics did not show a significant level of
urethane. It is therefore unlikely that a risk remains.
CRISM: Tests indicated CRISM internal and external optics were not affected, within
measurement error of -2.5%.
MCS: There is no doubt that there will be loss to science if the worst-case scenario came to be.
The team has not assessed what the magnitude of the loss might be. Nor have they assessed how
well observations of the moon or Mars would compensate for the target degradation. If the
instrument were to be cleaned there might still be some loss of reflectivity from interstitial
contaminant in pits, cracks, or rough hollows that escaped the mechanical cleaning which is most
effective.
ONC: No tests or visual inspections of ONC have been performed. Therefore there is a small
risk that ONC optics were contaminated. However Synnott's assessment (that the cameras were
protected by the spacecraft and that there is not a significant risk) appears to be sound. The
project has asked the PI to perform a visual inspection.
4.1.4.	 Recommendations
Rl- Proceed with planned experiments to contaminate and clean additional materials samples
representative of MCS solar calibration targets, to enable an informed decision regarding the
risks and benefits of MCS target cleaning.
R2- It is up to the MCS team to assess the trade-offs and to decide to clean or not. Effort should
be made to recover calibration as much as possible from observations of the moon (during early
cruise) and Mars (during cruise and orbital phases). This ,, ill impact cruise and orbital
operations. It will require a significant and on-going effort to quantify calibration uncertainties.
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R3- To address possible risk from re-volatilization of parts exposed to contamination verify that
no instrument or spacecraft heaters or electronics parts were exposed to contaminant, or clean or
replace if there were any.
R4- General comment for all instruments: All instruments should consider additional in-flight
calibrations or test that might reveal the effects of contamination that was missed prior to launch
or that may result from re-volatilization of material during aerobraking or some other phase of
the mission. An example of such a test might be imaging a bright star to measure instrument
PSF or transmission.
4.2.	 Risk 2: Engineering Sensor Contamination
4.2.1.	 Risk Description
Engineering sensor contamination compromises flight system abilities.
4.2.2.	 Findings
Two contamination-sensitive engineering sensors are located exterior to surface of the spacecraft
which were affected by the contamination, the sun sensors and the star tracker. In the case of the
sun sensors, which were on the side of the spacecraft where the contamination occurred, the
sensors have been cleaned according to procedures recommended by the sensor providers. The
star tracker was located on the side of the spacecraft opposite the contamination source (as with
the ONC payload instrument) and as such is not believed to have been contaminated. Visual
inspection by Jim Chapel, LMA GNC Lead and Kent Hoilman, LMA Star Tracker CPE
confirmed no indication of contamination on the Star Tracker optics.
4.2.3.	 Assessment
Risk to the sun sensors should have been mitigated by the cleaning and risk of having
contaminated the star trackers is minimal,.
4.2.4.	 Recommendations
None.
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4.3.	 Risk 3: Thermal Surface Contamination
4.3.1.	 Risk Description
Spacecraft surface contamination compromises ability to maintain thermal control. The
manifestation of this risk increases uncertainty in the analytical simulation of the thermal
behavior and leads to unforeseen temperatures during the mission.
4.3.2.	 Findings
In response to this incidence, per Reference 1, germanium coated surfaces and painted IR
radiators are being replaced with spares or new builds and other thermal control surfaces are
cleaned with proven procedures:
Clean Black Kapton With Ethyl Acetate Wipe	 (Complete)
Clean Silver Teflon Radiator	 (Complete)
Replace Two Painted IR Radiators	 (Complete)
Verify Cleanliness	 (In-Process)
Clean Remaining Blankets with IPA	 (Per Standard Process prior to final
installation)
Germanium surfaces/UHF Radome
Replace With Spare	 (Complete)
a/s measurements of sample cleaned blankets 	 (Complete)
4.3.3.	 Assessment
Possible consequences of this contamination, if not removed, could be that thermal optical
properties change their values during the T/V test as well as long term degradation behavior (due
to changes in these properties after the contamination is exposed to UV radiation during flight).
These properties are integral part of the thermal design validation, the objective of this test. The
questions arising from this condition are: 1) Has the validation objective been compromised, and
2) Is the ability of the thermal control system to meet flight requirements compromised?
In regards to 1), contamination tends to raise solar absorption. This is especially noticeable
where initial values are low. There is typically a lesser effect on infrared emittance values. The
changed solar absorption property does not enter into consideration. This is because the test did
not use solar simulation to exercise this property. Changes in infrared emittance do enter in the
correlation of test data. Unless the IR emittance values have been measured for contaminated
surfaces, this effect can not be included into the correlation and it will carry an additional degree
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of uncertainty. However, the overall impact is expected to be small and can be absorbed. This is
because the change in the emittance values is typically small and the thermal design is based on
bounding values (Beginning-of-Life to End-of-Life) far beyond these incremental changes
during the test.
In regards to 2), the optical properties for cleaned blankets are within the measured values for
control specimens and pre-TVAC measured values. Concern about continued deterioration of
these properties is reduced to the typical aging effect (of a clean blanket), which is included in
the design.
The measured values for the black KaptonTM and perforated second-surface aluminized ("Gold")
KaptonTM thermal blankets are shown in Table 1. The Control Specimen was taken from the
current LMA thermal materials stock. Measurements were made prior to the thermal test (Pre-
TVAC) and after the thermal test once the thermal blankets were cleaned (Post-TVAC). As you
can see there is little if any variance between the three sets of measurements. This indicates that
the cleaning technique used to remove the polyurethane contaminant did not degrade the BOL
properties of the thermal blankets.
Table 1- Blanket Cleanin g Results
Material	 Control Specimen	 Spacecraft Thermal Blankets
Pre-TVAC	 Post-TVAC &
Cleaning
a	 s	 a	 s	 a	 s
Black KaptonTM	0.94	 0.81	 0.95-0.97	 0.81-	 0.94	 0.81
0.82
"Gold" KaptonTM	0.39	 0.73	 0.40-0.43	 0.72-	 0.41	 0.73
0.75
In final assessment, the cleaning or replacement of contaminated surfaces restores the original
confidence in the thermal design; with a minor residual increase of uncertainty in test data
correlation due to small but currently unquantified changes in IR emittance. However, these
changes are well within the margin of the thermal design.
4.3.4.	 Recommendations
R5 - Evaluate merits of measuring the IR properties of contaminated MLI and use in thermal
model correlation (if available — otherwise consider value of re-contaminating materials
specifically for this purpose).
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4.4.	 Risk 4: Re-contamination from uncleaned surfaces
4.4.1.	 Risk Description
Contamination from TN test remains on spacecraft, providing opportunity to migrate and re-
contaminate other surfaces at a later time
4.4.2.	 Findings
The spacecraft thermal control blankets were removed from the spacecraft, cleaned and will be
reintegrated onto the spacecraft at KSC prior to final closeout. The black KaptonTM blankets
were cleaned with ethyl acetate. The perforated second-surface aluminized ("gold") KaptonTM
blankets will be cleaned with Isopropyl Alcohol (IPA). The UHF radome germanium-coated
black KaptonTM surface, as well as all other germanium coated surfaces were replaced with the
flight spares or replacement units. The radiator "windows" were replaced with unexposed
radiator panels (painted KaptonTM) on the affected blankets (2 places). The cleaning method
used was developed by the JPL Analytical Chemistry Laboratory. Both IPA and Ethyl Acetate
removed the contaminant with a mechanical action similar to cleaning ordinary eyeglasses
(Reference 9).
The officially documented MRO exterior surface cleanliness level requirement at launch is less
than 1.0 mg/fe per IEST-STD-CC-1246D (Ref. 10, 11). As part of the resolution plan for the
contamination anomaly, the LMA corrective action documented in their Problem/Incident
Reporting System (PIRS), all affected thermal blankets would be removed and cleaned.
Removed blankets were required to be cleaned to a level of 0.5 mg/ft 2 as measured by NVR
analysis. Furthermore, any cleaned surface as detected by swab sampling and FTIR analysis to
contain polyurethane was required to be cleaned to a level of 0.2 mg/ft 2. Based on these
requirements, the residual contamination levels are well below the required levels.
The highest expected temperatures are during aerobraking. Only the outer layer of the
Spacecraft Aft Deck KaptonTM blankets is expected to exceed temperatures of 100° C. The
predicted temperatures range from 205° C to 345° C. The temperatures on the outer layer of the
most severely contaminated blankets (HiRISE) is predicted to range from -72° C to 29° C after
the aerobraking maneuver (Reference 12).
4.4.3.	 Assessment
The contamination remaining on the spacecraft thermal control blankets will not pose a risk to
the MRO spacecraft or instruments. The contaminant i ill only become "mobile" when heated to
the temperature at which it was deposited (approximately 160° C). The cruise and aerobraking
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temperatures are predicted to be well below these levels for the "contaminated and cleaned"
blankets. The residual contamination will not be a risk to the MRO spacecraft or instruments.
The outer layer of the thermal control blankets on the Aft Deck which will see the most severe
temperatures during aerobraking. These blanket surfaces were the least contaminated during the
TV test and the sample did not contain any polyurethane, the marker from the outgassing Z306
paint (Ref. 1). It is expected that these low levels of contamination, well below the exterior
surface level requirement of 1.0 mg/ft 2 , will not be a risk to the MRO spacecraft or instruments.
4.4.4.	 Recommendations
None.
5.	 Root Cause/Corrective Actions
Standard environmental testing practice for the MRO spacecraft would have called for solar
simulation to be used to produce the required thermal input for the cruise phase of the mission.
However during the chamber checkout, it was discovered that the window used for the solar
simulation was cracked and needed to be replaced. The replacement window could not be
delivered in time to support the MRO thermal test (Ref. 13). An alternate test set-up was devised
and used during the MRO thermal test. This required a "heater panel" that would be cantilevered
over the MRO spacecraft and provide the necessary thermal heating to simulate the cruise phase
thermal profile.
The heater panel was designed and built by LMA. The heater panel that was used during the
MRO thermal test was painted on both sides with Aeroglaze Z306. Zonal strip heaters were to
provide better control of the heater panel temperatures. The upper side (away from the
spacecraft) of the heater panel was covered with a Kapton TM blanket (Ref. 1). JPL provided
oversight to ensure that this alternate test set-up would in fact produce the required thermal
profile and thus produce valid test results, given the unavailability of solar input (Reference:
personal communication with Ray Garcia, JPL, 15 April 2005).. In the amount of time available
for this investigation, the independent assessment team has not had time to penetrate the LMA
design process for this heater panel and thus are unable to determine what design reviews were
held to approve the design of the heater panel.
The heater panel in question was required to be maintained at 140 C for an extended duration to
simulate the cruise phase thermal profile. This is above the manufacturer's recommended
service temperature for the paint used to coat it. The manufacturer does not recommend that the
paint be used above 250° F (— 121° C) and states that above these temperatures the paint starts to
degrade. At temperatures above 300° F (-- 149° C) the paint breaks down and "ashes"
(Reference: personal communication with Bob Headsel, Lord Corporation, 14 April 2005).
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Due to the control loop for the heater panel, during the MRO thermal test, the heater panel
temperature was initially raised to approximately 162° C for several minutes, significantly above
the cruise phase temperature of 140° C, and well above the manufacturer's recommended
operational temperature. This may have been due to the control loop being operated via a
thermocouple in a cooler portion of the panel and thus, much of the panel may have been
overdriven to reach the required temperature.
Additionally, the paint used was beyond its shelf life several times over, having been
manufactured in August 2002 with a recommended shelf life of one year. Mechanical testing of
adhesive properties of the paint was conducted prior to use, but no chemical testing appears to
have been conducted.
Regardless of the degree to which these additional considerations did or did not contribute to the
anomaly, it is clear that there was a breakdown in the development of the specification for the
heater panel between the temperature that it was required to work at and the painted surface
treatment chosen for the equipment. This assessment team believes that a mismatch between the
intended use of the heater and the selection of the paint to cover it is the root cause of the
anomaly.
6.	 Open Items & Work Remaining
In addition to the recommendation listed above under each specific risk the following additional
recommendations are made by the team, not related to any individual risk. Except as noted,
these actions have been discussed with the MRO project and the independent assessment team is
under the impression that the project intends to complete these actions.
R6 — A review of the process by which support equipment design is specified to determine how
usage of this Z306 paint on a heater required to operate above the recommended service
temperature of the paint should be conducted. Additionally review criteria for involvement of
material specialists as part of process for specifying design and fabrication of support equipment
as well as flight hardware.
R7 - Additional investigations should be conducted as to whether the age of the paint in question
was a significant contributing factor to incident. LMA has indicated that they intend to conduct
calorimeter tests of both the paint involved in the incident (used past manufacturer recommended
shelf life) and new material within its recommended shelf life. Materials practices related to use
of dated materials past manufacturer recommended shelf life should be reviewed once the results
of this test have been completed.
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7.	 Index of Referenced Material
The following material was reviewed by the team (in most cases, as provided by the MRO
Project) over the course of the assessment. It is included on a CD-ROM accompanying the
release of this report for future reference. Charles Whetsel, team lead, may be contacted for
additional copies as needed.
Reference 1: Presentation material —"TVAC_Contam_2005_04_12.ppt" dated 12 April 2005, by
Tim Gasparrim
Reference 2: Presentation material - "marci_ctx_contam vgs.ppt" dated 08 April 2005 and email
from Mike Malin to Charles Whetsel dated 12 Apr 2005
Reference 3: Presentation material — "HiRISE TV Contain Assess.ppt" (authors R. Fenolia / J.
Bergstrom) dated 08 April 2005
Reference 4: Presentation material - "CRISM_telecon_04-08-05al.ppt," by Peter Bedim, dated
08 April, 2005.
Reference 5: Email correspondence — "Assessment of CRISM contamination," Scott Murchie to
Richard Zurek (based on analysis of David Humm, CRISM calibration specialist), dated 14,
April 2005.
Reference 6: Presentation Material: "MCS Contamination Response.ppt" dated 08 April, 2005.
Reference 7: Email correspondence: "Contamination on ONC Optics," Steve Synnott to John
Duxburry, 06 April, 2005.
Reference 8: Email correspondence: "Question re: MARCI cleaning/calibration," Mike Malin to
Charles Whetsel, dated 12 April, 2005
Reference 9: JPL Interoffice Memorandum IOM Q066, M. Anderson to Brian Blakkolb, 29
March 2005
Reference 10: Contamination Control Plan for the MARS RECONNAISSANCE ORBITER,
Document No. MRO-01-0013, 1 May 2002.
Reference 11: MARS RECONNAISSANCE ORBITER SYSTEM CONTAMINATION
CONTROL PLAN, Document No. JPL-D-24373, MRO-21-329 Rev. 3, 25 July 2003.
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Reference 12: Presentation Material: "Aerobraking Temperatures.ppt," dated 14 April, 2005
Reference 13: Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter Pre-Environmental Readiness Review Presentation
Package (with supplemental presentation; R. Becker, JPL), 9 November 2004.
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Appendix F. Response by the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter (MRO) Project
to the Actions Recommended by the MRO TN Anomaly
Independent Assessment Team
DRAFT
Report to the JPL Chief Engineer By Richard Zurek MRO Project Scientist
June 13, 2005
Preamble:
This report summarizes the response to date of the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter (MRO) Project
to the recommendations of the MRO TN Anomaly Independent Assessment Report (Final,
Revision H, dated April 20 t11 , 2005).
This summary focuses on those recommendations addressing the recovery of the science payload
from the contamination event that occurred in February 2005 during the MRO system
thermal/vacuum JN) testing. That recovery is nearly complete. All instruments have sampled
surfaces where the suspected contamination could lead to degraded performance of the
instrument. Surrounding blankets and exterior surfaces have been cleaned_ Tests showed that
only the Mars Color Imager (MARCI) had optics that required cleaning and that was
successfully done (as confirmed by test) in April before the spacecraft was shipped to KSC in
preparation for launch in August, 2005.
The one remaining instrument issue is the potential contamination of the solar calibration target
attached to the Mars Climate Sounder (MCS). This target was exposed during the TN anomaly.
However, this target has a specially prepared surface that was extensively calibrated during
ground testing. A major concern has been that any cleaning agent capable of removing
contamination vapor-deposited during the TN anomaly could also alter the calibration target
surface in a way that would invalidate the ground calibration. Re-calibration of the target would
require its removal from the instrument; the risk to damaging the target further was sufficiently
high that it was decided to investigate potential mitigations that would not require such removal.
This was the situation at the time of the Independent Assessment Report, so several of their
investigations naturally focused on this issue. The present report summarizes the latest findings
for recovery of MCS; however, work still continues at this time.
The report is organized with statements of the action recommended in the assessment report,
followed by a brief summary of the MRO Project's response. An appendix gives a more detailed
overview of the MCS activities. Two actions were focused on understanding details of the TN
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anomaly and possible changes in procedures to prevent future anomalies of this type.
Preliminary action to prevent future anomalies has been undertaken, though formal
documentation of this has received lower priority at this time.
Summary Response to Actions Recommended in the Independent
Assessment Report
Rl- Proceed with planned experiments to contaminate and clean additional materials
samples representative of MCS solar calibration target (SCT), to enable an informed
decision regarding the risks and benefits of MCS target cleaning.
Response: The planned experiments were conducted but led to unexpected results. In brief, tests
with the flight instrument did not establish that the cleaning approach (brushing with acetone)
developed and tested using re-contaminated samples was effective and safe when used on the
flight MCS Solar Calibration Target (SCT).
• From the start, a major concern has been that a cleaning method which removes the
contamination may alter the target surface in such a way that invalidates the ground
calibration already performed.
• A severe limitation in testing material samples representative of the MCS SCT is that
only samples discarded earlier in the manufacturing process of the target were available,
until just last week (June 9) when a discard of material trimmed from the flight target
before calibration was located.
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The Mars Climate Sounder (MCS) Instrument
I
OF
- f
R2- It is up to the MCS team to assess the trade-offs and to decide to clean or not. Effort
should be made to recover calibration as much as possible from observations of the moon
(during earl- cruise) and Mars (during cruise and orbital phases). This will impact cruise
and orbital operations. It will require a significant and on-going effort to quantify
calibration uncertainties.
Response: The MRO Project is now considering two possible actions:
1) Cleaning the target with the developed acetone-brushing technique. Further analysis by the
MCS Team must:
• Demonstrate that the acetone-brushing will not alter the SCT surface properties or
introduce contamination.
o This is being tested using a recently discovered off-cut of the flight SCT plate
which will be cleaned and then visually inspected and characterized using an
UV-Laser Induced Native Fluorescence (UV- LINF) technique
• Validate that the visually observed brightening of the cleaned test area on the SCT is
sufficient evidence that enough contamination is on the target to warrant cleaning,
given the risk of altering the surface
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• Validate that the inability of the UV-LINF measurements of a test area on the flight
SCT to detect differences before and after cleaning do not indicate that no
contamination has occurred (i.e., it is a limitation of the measurement)
2) Implementing an Engineering Change Request (ECR) to conduct activities in early and mid-
cruise in which the MCS instrument views its SCT. Observations at L+22 days would
characterize the target before it receives much direct solar UV radiation, known to darken the
contamination material detected after system Thermal/Vacuum (T/V) testing.
• Until L+30 days or so, the SCT is largely in shadow. During the rest of cruise,
exposure to direct sunlight has been estimated at 50 hours.
R3- To address possible risk from re-volatilization of parts exposed to contamination,
verify that no instrument or spacecraft heaters or electronics parts were exposed to
contaminant, or clean or replace if there were any.
Response: The only known area of significant contamination that has not been cleaned is the
MCS Solar Calibration Target. The SCT is not expected to be a significant source of
contamination, given its small size and the absence of any indication of a substantial
contamination of this area.
• Acetone brushing would have produced a more pronounced brightening of the SCT
test area than was observed, if the SCT were to be a major source of contamination.
R4- General comment for all instruments: All instruments should consider additional in-
flight calibrations or test that might reveal the effects of contamination that was missed
prior to launch or that may result from re-volatilization of material during aerobraking or
some other phase of the mission. An example of such a test might be imaging a bright star
to measure instrument PSF or transmission.
Response: No new calibrations have been added or are being considered for instruments other
than MCS. That is because contamination concerns and the need to check geometric alignments,
to test focus mechanisms, and to provide a basic radiometric check had already led to the design
of several major calibration activities in cruise and the ability to conduct stellar calibrations from
Mars orbit. [See Tables la,b.]
• The most sensitive instrument, the Compact Reconnaissance Imaging Spectrometer
for Mars (CRISM), has a cover which remains closed until the transition orbit,
following aerobraking and just prior to the start of the Primary Science Phase.
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• All instruments have heaters that are used as decontamination heaters, and all five
optical instruments use them early in Cruise (before the first course correction
maneuver).
Table 1a: MRO Cruise Activity Timeline
2005	 2006
Mission
Phase
Maneuver:
Cruise
Activities
SPE AngfE
DSN
Coverage
DDOR
Ka-Band
Launch	
Sept	 Oct	 Nov	 Dec	 Jan
•	 Launch Period
- (10 Aug 05 to 30 Aug 05)
Cruise (type I transfer)
TCM-1	 TCM-2	 Begin Approach
+ (L+15d)	 (Nov 17)
-'^ SIC Checkout (L to L+14)
r HiRISE-STU Alignment (Oct 6)
*MARC[ UV (L+3) (]Gyro-Star Tracker (Oct 19)	 Gravi ly2IS RP
+Instrutnerrt C/O (L+18)
	
	
(Dec 29 - Jan 5)
^^ Gravilyl(Nov 14 - 20)
#LUnaYI ONC-1 (Sept 8)
1 A HGA Checkout (Sept 9)	 +ONC-2 (Nov 30)MCS	 +Slellar-1 (Dec 7h
L. Thruster (Sept 15) 	
*Stellar-2 (Dec 14)
Stanford UHF (Sept 22)
^mmmmnwCRISM Decontamination	 it	 CRISM Decontamination
60'
a
Transition to HGA
co^u^uoUa
	
(Sept 20)	 -
-^ 1 pi59ltlpl
(10 total passes)
	
t	 t	 t	 t
Note: Labeled arrow indicates time proposed for observation of MCS Solar Calibration Target.
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Table lb
MRO Calibration Activities during Cruise
Calibration Time Instruments	 Objectives
Activity Frame
MARCI UV `^ug3 3 MARCI Radiometric in the UV bands
HiRISE, CTX, Verify payloads survived launchL+18 Instrument L+18,19 CRISM, MARCI,
and operate as expected. SHARA
Checkout (Aug 28-29) SHARAD, MCS, EMI testONC
Lunar—OC and Sept 7-8 HIRISE, CTX, HiRISE and CTX: stray light
ONC-1 Calibrations (L+28, 29) ONC, IMUs and geometric, radiometric.Star Trackers ONC: geometric
Electra/Stanford Sept 21-22 EUT (UHF Relay) Characterize antenna pattern with
Test (L+41,42) stable Earth source
Gravity-1 Nov 14-20 DSN tracking in Create baseline far from gravity
Calibration (L+95-101) support of TCM-2 fields
ONC-2 Nov 30 ONC Geometric Calibration (L+112)
Stellar-1 Dec 6-7 HiRISE, CTX.
Calibration (L+119) ONC, IMUs and Geometric, Radiometric
Star Trackers
HIRISE, CTX,
Stellar-2 Dec 13-14 SHARAD, MCS,
Calibration (L+126) CRISM, EUT, Geometric. Jitter, EMIMARCI, IMUs and
Star Trackers
Gravity-2 Dec 29-Jan 5 Uses s/c tracking	 Create baseline far from gravity
Calibration (L+141-148) data	 fields
HIRISE = High Resolution Imaging Science Experiment
CTX= Context Imager; MARCI= Mars Color Imager
CRISM= Compact Reconnaissance Imaging Spectrometer for Mars
MCS= Mars Climate Sounder; ONC= Optical Navigation Camera
SHARAD= Shallow Radar
Note: M  SCT in-flight characterization not yet approved;
assessment by MRO Project in progress.
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R5 - Evaluate merits of measuring the IR properties of contaminated MLI and use in
thermal model correlation (if available — otherwise consider value of re-contaminating
materials specifically for this purpose).
Response: The spacecraft and payload surfaces (except for the MCS solar target) that were
exposed to contamination during the spacecraft thermal event have been cleaned.
• The contaminated witness plate optic being used to support the MCS SCT contamination
recovery activities is possibly the only remaining sample of the TN contamination.
Re-contamination of materials in order to test effects on IR properties has not been pursued. The
experience of the JPL group working with the MCS team in preparing contaminated samples is
that it is difficult to get exact replication of the event. Suspected, though not demonstrated,
causes of this difficulty are differences in:
• The time-history of the temperatures of the source and of surfaces where vapor-
deposition; and/or
• The source of the contamination, as its composition may reflect subtle differences in the
curing process of the paint.
R6 — A review of the process by which support equipment design is specified to determine
how usage of this Z306 paint on a heater required to operate above the recommended
service temperature of the paint should be conducted. Additionally review criteria for
involvement of material specialists as part of process for specifying design and fabrication
of support equipment as well as flight hardware.
R7 - Additional investigations should be conducted as to whether the age of the paint in
question was a significant contributing factor to incident. LMA has indicated that they
intend to conduct calorimeter tests of both the paint involved in the incident (used past
manufacturer recommended shelf life) and new material within its recommended shelf life.
Materials practices related to use of dated materials past manufacturer recommended shelf
life should be reviewed once the results of this test have been completed.
Response to R6 and R7: Preliminary investigations of how this particular batch of Z306 paint
came to be used and exposed to high temperatures have been conducted. Analyses of the paint
are being conducted. Several processes are under review and lessons learned have been
identified. This work is still ongoing, but has been given lower priority than expediting the
recovery from the TN contamination event.
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Appendix: MCS Contamination Recovery Activities
Background
The Solar Calibration Target (SCT) on MCS is used to provide quantitative measurements of the
solar radiation reflected from the Martian atmosphere and surface, particularly in the polar
regions. The net radiation absorbed by carbon dioxide ice in the Martian polar regions is
balanced by the latent heating/cooling of condensation/ sublimation of COZ ice. Thus, a
quantitative measure of solar energy reflected from the seasonal frost can be translated directly
into the amount of mass exchanged between the atmosphere and surface on Mars on a seasonal
cycle. On Mars, as much as 30% of the atmospheric mass is exchanged in this manner.
Understanding this process is key to understanding the processes operating both in the present
climate and throughout Martian history.
Non-volatile-residue (NVR) wipes from the top (as positioned during the TN contamination
event) of thermal blankets on the MCS drum indicated the presence of vapor-deposited
contamination, consistent with contamination deposited elsewhere on the spacecraft from the
T/V heater plate. During the T/V contamination event the MCS solar calibration target (SCT)
was oriented approximately vertically, somewhat orthogonal to the likely path of outgassed
molecules. However, given the extended area of the contamination source (i.e., the T/V heater
plate) and its detection on the nearby instrument thermal blanket, it was reasonable to assume
that some contamination was present on the SCT.
As reported, the MCS team decided against removal of the solar calibration target from the
instrument because such removal entailed a moderate-to-high probability that such removal
would irreparably damage the target. The back-up target, the last of 6 targets originally
produced for flight, beginning with Mars Observer and continuing through Mars Climate Orbiter,
was judged to be significantly inferior to the flight target mounted on the instrument, even given
the potential contamination of the latter. Thus, it was not an option to mitigate damage to the
flight target during removal for cleaning or during in-place cleaning by use of the remaining
target. Because of its inferior quality, this last target also had not undergone the full calibration
procedure. Finally, it was judged not to be possible to manufacture and calibrate a new target as
the original manufacturer was not available and preparation and (ground) calibration of the target
entailed a lengthy process that could not be done in the time available to make a 2005 launch.
MRO project management concurred with the MCS team's recommendation to not remove the
SCT from the flight instrument; that instrument, with its solar calibration target plate attached,
remains in place on the spacecraft now at KSC. The MCS team then proceeded to evaluate
possible in situ cleaning and verification processes.
Preparations for MCS SCT Cleaning
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Because of the risk involved in removing the target from the instrument (discussed above), only
in situ cleaning processes were considered. Cleaning of the spacecraft thermal blankets by LMA
had indicated that there were cleaning agents that were effective if some pressure were applied to
remove contamination. Concerns for cleaning the SCT were: 1) that the cleaning agent and/or
cleaning action would alter the physical surface of the calibration target, thereby invalidating its
ground calibration, and 2) that the solvent might "soak through" and weaken the bonding
material holding the solar calibration target plate to its mechanical support or the temperature
device used to calibrate changes in flight to the reflectivity of the SCT.
To test cleaning procedures and agents, it was decided to contaminate several samples of the
material used to make the SCT plate. These samples had been parts of various larger plates used
to test manufacture procedures for the flight target. They had been prepared at various times and
their surfaces had been subjected to similar, though not identical, treatments to those used in the
early stages of manufacturing the final set of SCT plates. Because of these differences, several
target samples were chosen for testing. In adapting the target to the needs of MCS, the original
target was trimmed; it was thought that the trimmed pieces had been discarded at the time of
removal. They have since been located and are being used in ongoing tests of the cleaning
method.
To simulate the T/V contamination event as closely as possible, the cold plate used in TN
testing was selected as a contamination source. This plate had been painted with the same
material and cured along with the heater plate at the same time, but it had not been heated to high
temperatures and so was not believed to have outgassed the material that contaminated the
spacecraft and payload in TN. The plate was sent by LMA to JPL where it was sectioned and
then heated to the same temperatures achieved by the heater plate during TN. NVR wipes and
analysis indicated that contamination was deposited on the (4) MCS target samples, although not
in the same quantity (approximately a factor of 5 less) as was measured on the MCS thermal
blankets after the TN event. Furthermore, there was an indication that the UV-visible spectrum
of contamination was somewhat different from that recovered from the spacecraft, indicating that
similar materials were present, but in different proportions. Later, this would prove to be a
critical difference.
All samples were first cleaned by exposure to an oxygen-atom plasma known to be effective in
the removal of organic material. A number of the samples were then contaminated by vapor
deposition in vacuum. Parts of several samples were cleaned using acetone and a brushing
procedure. Despite the small amount of contamination assayed, there were distinct visible
differences between cleaned and non-cleaned areas. Examination using UV-Laser Induced
Native Fluorescence (UV-LINF) indicated that most contamination had been removed in a single
cleaning, but a residual film remained even after multiple cleanings. This was established by
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comparison with an uncontaminated sample. Examination of cleaned areas of the sample
material using optical microscopy indicated no change in the stricture of the surface materials.
Furthermore, the high rate of evaporation of the acetone using in the cleaning technique insured
that there would be no "soaking through" of the solvent.
Activities at KSC
Armed with the UV-LINF and a proven cleaning technique, the MCS team journeyed to KSC in
late May. The UV-LINF equipment was used to characterize the spectral response of the MCS
SCT in 6 spectral channels ranging from 0.29 to 0.55 microns. A small area on the edge of the
SCT plate, outside the field of view of the instrument's detectors, was measured before and after
cleaning with the acetone brushing. Two unexpected results were immediately noted:
1. The spectral signature of the SCT was different than the signatures of the contaminated
samples, the original non-contaminated samples; and those samples cleaned with the oxygen
atom technique.
2. The cleaning produced no measurable change in 5 of the 6 UV-LINF channels and an
ambiguous result in the 6-th channel (at 0.29 microns). However, there was a subtle
brightening of the test surface compared to the rest of the target, as observed visually after
cleaning.
A second cleaning was attempted on the test area and there was some indication by the UV-LINF
that there was more fluorescence than before, indicating that the cleaning may actually have
degraded the surface or possibly contaminated it. In any case, there was no evidence of a
substantial contamination of the surface. The MCS Team confirmed that the UV-LINF was
working properly by re-measuring contaminated samples that had been measured at JPL and
subsequently sent to KSC. Given the situation, it was decided not to clean the working area of
the SCT, and the team returned to JPL.
Further Testing at JPL
The discovery of material that had been trimmed from the flight SCT plate permitted UV-LINF
measurements that showed the trimmed material had a similar spectral signature to the flight
SCT surface and that both were different from the samples that had been used in the
contamination tests. Differences were ascribed to the final stages of manufacturing of the flight
SCT, in which the surface was significantly roughed; as a result it appears darker (more
precisely, it scatters light more diffusely, as desired) than either the samples or the flight spare,
which was not taken through the final processing step.
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Given the lack of detection of spectral change when the test area was cleaned, it was decided to
measure the last remaining witness optic that still had contamination vapor-deposited on it
during the T/V anomaly. These measurements were then compared to measurements of a clean
(standard) witness optic. No change was detected, except possibly in the shortest wavelength
channel. That is, except in one channel, the UV-LINF had been shown to be insensitive to the
actual contamination, resulting in the following conclusions:
1) The flight SCT could have a thin film of contamination that was vapor-deposited during
the T/V anomaly and the acetone-brushing could have removed it.
a. Evidence for the thinness of the deposit and for its possible removal is given by
the slight brightening of the target after cleaning, OR
b. The acetone-brushing was contaminating the target in some way so that it
brightened the test area where it was applied.
2) The contamination produced using what had been the cold plate from TN testing had
produced a different contamination composition than the heater plate had produced
during TN.
a. The UV-LINF technique could easily detect the presence of contaminant
produced in the JPL tests, but not of the TN contaminant.
b. Differences could be due to slight differences in curing, but LMA records indicate
that both the cold and heater plates were painted with the same material and cured
in the same chamber at the same time.
Current Activities (June 13-15)
A third of the area of the piece trimmed from the flight SCT is being cleaned to examine its
visual properties and then to characterize its surface with the UV-LINF. Visual, optical
microscopy and UV-LINF measurements may be able to establish that the properties of the
cleaned piece remain the same as before cleaning when no contamination is present. In this case,
the MCS Team may conclude that acetone-brushing of the surface will not harn the surface, and
that the UV-LINF measurements at KSC of the SCT test area after cleaning were simply due to
measurement noise.
If this is not the case, then no cleaning will be attempted. If the acetone brushing produces no
change, then the next step is to determine whether the SCT is in fact significantly contaminated.
This may have to rely on visual inspection alone, but the short-wavelength UV-LINF channel
data are also being re-examined. The residue from the acetone cleaning was captured and has
been returned to JPL for analysis; this may also be decisive in judging whether there is
significant contamination of the SCT.
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A new attempt at cleaning the SCT will be tried only if the acetone brushing can be judged to be
safe and even then only if it is judged that there is sufficient residue on the SCT to warrant the
risk of cleaning.
In the meantime, the proposed observation of the SCT early in cruise before solar UV may
darken a contaminated surface and then later in cruise is being pursued in order to characterize
any change that may occur during flight.
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Appendix G. List of Acronyms
Ar Argon
BCM Battery Control Module
COZ Carbon Dioxide
CRISM Compact Reconnaissance Imaging Spectrometer for Mars
GRC Glenn Research Center
GSFC Goddard Space Flight Center
IPA Isopropyl Alcohol
JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory
KSC Kennedy Space Center
LaRC Langley Research Center
LMA Lockheed Martin Aerospace
MARCI Mars Color Imager
MCS Mars Climate Sounder
MLI Multi-Layer Insulation
MRB Material Review Board
MRO Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter
MRR Mission Reconfiguration Review
MSFC Marshall Space Flight Center
Nz Nitrogen
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NCE NESC Chief Engineer
NESC NASA Engineering and Safety Center
NRB NESC Review Board
NVR Non-Volatile Residue
RGA Residual Gas Analyzer
SCT Solar Calibration Target
SMARR Safety & Mission Assurance Readiness Review
SPRT Super Problem Resolution Team
T/V Thermal/Vacuum
T/V AIAT T/V Anomaly Independent Assessment Team
TGA/FTIR Thermo gravimetrie Analysis/Fourier Transform Infrared
TQCM Thermoelectric Quartz-Crystal Contamination Monitor
UHF Ultra High Frequency
UV Ultraviolet
UV-LINF UV-Laser Induced Native Fluorescence
WPAFB Wright Patterson Air Force Base
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